
By Achim D. Brucker, Frank Rittinger, and Burkhart Wolff.
We present a secure architecture of a CVS-server, its implementation
(i.e. mainly its configuration) and its formal analysis. Our CVS-server
is uses cvsauth, that provides protection of passwords and protection of
some internal data of the CVS repository. In contrast to other (security
oriented) CVS-architectures, our approach allows the CVS-server run on
an open filesystem, i.e. a filesystem where users can have direct access
both by CVS-commands and by standard UNIX/POSIX commands such as
mv
. For our secure architecture of the CVS-server, we
provide a formal specification and security analysis. The latter is
based on a refinement mapping high-level security requirements on the
architecture on low-level security mechanisms on the UNIX/POSIX
filesystem level. The purpose of the formal analysis of the secure
CVS-server architecture is twofold: First, it is the bases for the
specification of mutual security properties such as non-repudiation,
authentication and access control for this architecture. Second, the
mapping of the architecture on standard security implementation
technology is described. Thus, our approach can be seen as a method to
give a formal underpinning for the usually tricky business of system
administrators.
Keywords: Security Architecture, Concurrent Versions System (CVS), Z, Formal Methods, Refinement, Access Control
Please cite this work as follows: A. D. Brucker, F. Rittinger, and B. Wolff, “A CVS-Server security architecture — concepts and formal analysis,” Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 182, 2002. Author copy: https://logicalhacking.com/publications/brucker.ea-cvs-server-2002-b/
@TechReport{ brucker.ea:cvs-server:2002-b,
author = {Achim D. Brucker and Frank Rittinger and Burkhart Wolff},
institution = {Albert-Ludwigs-Universit{\"a}t Freiburg},
language = {USenglish},
number = {182},
areas = {security, formal methods, software},
title = {A {CVS-Server} Security Architecture --- Concepts and Formal
Analysis},abstract = {We present a secure architecture of a CVS-server, its
implementation (i.e. mainly its configuration) and its formal
analysis. Our CVS-server is uses cvsauth, that provides
protection of passwords and protection of some internal data
of the CVS repository. In contrast to other (security
oriented) CVS-architectures, our approach allows the
CVS-server run on an open filesystem, i.e. a filesystem where
users can have direct access both by CVS-commands and by\texttt{mv}. For our
standard UNIX/POSIX commands such as
secure architecture of the CVS-server, we provide a formal
specification and security analysis. The latter is based on a
refinement mapping high-level security requirements on the
architecture on low-level security mechanisms on the
UNIX/POSIX filesystem level. The purpose of the formal
analysis of the secure CVS-server architecture is twofold:
First, it is the bases for the specification of mutual
security properties such as non-repudiation, authentication
and access control for this architecture. Second, the mapping
of the architecture on standard security implementation
technology is described. Thus, our approach can be seen as a
method to give a formal underpinning for the usually tricky
business of system administrators.},keywords = {Security Architecture, Concurrent Versions System (CVS), Z,
Formal Methods, Refinement, Access Control},year = {2002},
num_pages = {100},
note = {Author copy: \url{https://logicalhacking.com/publications/brucker.ea-cvs-server-2002-b/}},
pdf = {https://logicalhacking.com/publications/brucker.ea-cvs-server-2002-b/brucker.ea-cvs-server-2002-b.pdf},
}