by Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and Anders Schlichtkrull
In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model.
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Please cite this article as follows:
Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and Anders Schlichtkrull.
Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols.
In 34th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). , 1, pages 143-158, IEEE, 2021.
(full text as PDF file) (BibTeX) (Endnote) (RIS) (Word) (doi:10.1109/CSF51468.2021.00006) (
abstract | = | {In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model.}, | |
author | = | {Andreas V. Hess and Sebastian M{\"o}dersheim and Achim D. Brucker and Anders Schlichtkrull}, | |
booktitle | = | {34th {IEEE} Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)}, | |
doi | = | {10.1109/CSF51468.2021.00006}, | |
location | = | {June 21-25, 2021, Dubrovnik, Croatia}, | |
pages | = | {143--158}, | |
= | {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/download/2021/hess.ea-performing-2021.pdf}, | ||
publisher | = | {{IEEE}}, | |
title | = | {Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols}, | |
url | = | {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/hess.ea-performing-2021}, | |
volume | = | {1}, | |
year | = | {2021}, |